Balance the current budget over the economic cycle and enshrine it in law
Governments should not routinely spend more than they raise in revenue. This is not an ideological position. It is a mathematical one. Sustained deficits accumulate as debt, and the interest on that debt diverts spending from public services towards bondholders. The UK currently spends more on debt interest than on defence.
That said, rigid annual balance targets are counterproductive. In a recession, the government should spend more, not less. Austerity during a downturn deepens the pain and delays recovery. The lesson of 2010 to 2015 is that cutting too fast costs more in the long run.
The answer is a fiscal rule that requires balance over the economic cycle, typically five to seven years, with independent verification by the OBR. Borrow to invest in infrastructure, because that spending generates returns. Do not borrow to fund day to day spending, because that is passing the bill to the next generation.
This is not glamorous politics. But sound public finances are the foundation on which everything else depends. A government that cannot manage its finances cannot credibly promise anything.
Defence spending at 2.5% of GDP with a focus on cyber and reserves
The world is less stable than it has been at any point since the end of the Cold War. Russia has invaded a European democracy. China is expanding its military capabilities. The Middle East is in crisis. And the UK, a nuclear power and permanent member of the Security Council, spends barely 2% of GDP on defence and struggles to recruit enough soldiers to fill its reduced army.
Increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP over the parliament, with specific investment in three areas. First, cyber capabilities, because the next serious attack on this country is more likely to be digital than physical. Second, reserve forces, because a small professional army needs a credible reserve behind it. Third, defence procurement reform, because the current system wastes billions on late, over-budget projects.
A well-defended country is a free country. This is the first obligation of any government and it has been neglected for too long by parties of all stripes.
Restore trust in institutions by making appointments genuinely independent
The erosion of institutional independence is one of the most damaging trends in recent British politics. Appointments to quangos, regulators, and public bodies are increasingly made on the basis of political loyalty rather than competence. The result is institutions that neither the public nor professionals trust.
Ofcom, the BBC board, the Charity Commission, the House of Lords. All have seen appointments that raised serious questions about the qualifications and independence of the people chosen. When the public sees cronies installed in positions of authority, it reinforces the belief that the system serves insiders, not citizens.
Create a genuinely independent Public Appointments Commission with the power to veto ministerial appointments that fail to meet competence criteria. Require all public appointees above a certain grade to appear before a select committee and receive its approval. Transparency and competence are not unreasonable demands. They are the minimum.
A serious immigration system that is firm, fair, and actually enforced
Immigration policy in the UK oscillates between targets nobody believes in and rhetoric nobody trusts. Both left and right are responsible. The left pretends there are no trade-offs. The right makes promises it has no mechanism to keep. The public has lost faith in the system entirely, and understandably so.
A workable immigration policy needs three things. First, a properly funded border and enforcement system. Not performative gestures like sending people to Rwanda, but actual investment in processing, returns, and cooperation with France and the EU. Second, a fast, humane asylum system. People waiting years for a decision is cruel to them and expensive for us. Most claims can be processed in weeks if the system is staffed properly. Third, a work visa system that responds to genuine labour shortages without suppressing wages.
None of this is impossible. It requires competence, honesty, and the political courage to disappoint people on both sides who prefer slogans to solutions.
National service reimagined as a voluntary civic year with real incentives
The proposal for mandatory national service was poorly conceived and rightly criticised. Compulsion breeds resentment, not civic spirit. But the underlying instinct that young people would benefit from a structured opportunity for service is sound.
Create a well-funded, voluntary Civic Year programme. Participants spend 12 months in public service: NHS trusts, environmental restoration, care homes, youth work, emergency services, or military reserve training. In return, they receive a living stipend, a £10,000 grant towards education or a housing deposit, and a qualification.
Make it attractive enough that people want to do it. Target 100,000 places per year. Fund it properly. The military version of this has worked well in countries like Estonia. The civilian version, based loosely on AmeriCorps in the United States, builds skills, social bonds, and a shared sense of purpose that is otherwise hard to create in a fragmented society.
A five-year ban on former ministers lobbying their own department, with real enforcement
The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) is a fig leaf. It has no statutory powers. It can be ignored, and regularly is. When a former minister takes a lobbying role that touches their old brief, the committee issues a polite letter. Nothing else happens.
The Greensill affair demonstrated what this looks like in practice. A former Prime Minister lobbied the Treasury on behalf of a financial services firm that collapsed owing billions, and the existing rules were inadequate to prevent, deter, or properly investigate it. The subsequent reviews recommended stronger rules. The rules were not strengthened.
Impose a statutory five-year lobbying ban on any former Secretary of State or Minister of State, preventing them from accepting any role that involves direct contact with their former department on matters they handled in office. Breaches to be criminal offences, investigated by an independent commissioner with proper powers of disclosure.
This is not a radical proposal. It is weaker than the equivalent rules in France. It is the minimum required to restore public trust. Trust, once lost, takes decades to rebuild. We should stop burning it for the sake of a few consultancy fees.
What do you think?
Vote on individual policies, adapt them, or write your own alternative. Good ideas should be tested.